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Compte / Postlewaite

Ignorance and Uncertainty

Medium: Buch
ISBN: 978-1-108-43449-2
Verlag: Cambridge University Press
Erscheinungstermin: 06.03.2019
Lieferfrist: bis zu 10 Tage

Born of a belief that economic insights should not require much mathematical sophistication, this book proposes novel and parsimonious methods to incorporate ignorance and uncertainty into economic modeling, without complex mathematics. Economics has made great strides over the past several decades in modeling agents' decisions when they are incompletely informed, but many economists believe that there are aspects of these models that are less than satisfactory. Among the concerns are that ignorance is not captured well in most models, that agents' presumed cognitive ability is implausible, and that derived optimal behavior is sometimes driven by the fine details of the model rather than the underlying economics. Compte and Postlewaite lay out a tractable way to address these concerns, and to incorporate plausible limitations on agents' sophistication. A central aspect of the proposed methodology is to restrict the strategies assumed available to agents.


Produkteigenschaften


  • Artikelnummer: 9781108434492
  • Medium: Buch
  • ISBN: 978-1-108-43449-2
  • Verlag: Cambridge University Press
  • Erscheinungstermin: 06.03.2019
  • Sprache(n): Englisch
  • Auflage: Erscheinungsjahr 2019
  • Serie: Econometric Society Monographs
  • Produktform: Kartoniert, Paperback
  • Gewicht: 443 g
  • Seiten: 320
  • Format (B x H x T): 152 x 229 x 17 mm
  • Ausgabetyp: Kein, Unbekannt
Autoren/Hrsg.

Autoren

Olivier Compte is a Professor at the Paris School of Economics and École des Ponts ParisTech.

Andrew Postlewaite is the Harry P. Kamen Professor of Economics and a Professor of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania.

Introduction; Part I. Modeling Challenges: 1. Action space; 2. Ignorance and uncertainty; 3. Observations, perceptions and strategies; 4. Strategies and strategy restrictions; 5. Knowledge and beliefs; Part II. Legends and Myths: 6. Information aggregation; 7. Mechanism design; 8. Surplus extraction; 9. Folk theorems; 10. Comparative statics; Part III. Applications: 11. Auctions; 12. Learning; 13. Reputation; 14. Cooperation; 15. Influence; 16. Information aggregation in markets; 17. Bargaining; 18. Attrition; 19. Reputation; 20. Coordination; 21. Ambiguity and other complexity related aversions; Miscellanea; Index.