Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling.-
Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks.- Measuring Nearly Single-peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights.- Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model.- Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination.-
Preference Elicitation.-
Incremental elicitation of preferences: optimist or pessimist?.- Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees.- Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals.-
Preference Aggregation and Voting.-
In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution.- Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters.- Computing Kemeny Rankings From d-Euclidean Preferences.- Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation.-
Manipulation in Voting.-
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules.- Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games.- Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams.- The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules.-
Fair Division and Resource Allocation.-
Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs.- On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods.- On Reachable Assignments in Cycles.- Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average.-
Algorithmic Decision Theory.-
Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions under Matroid Constraints.- Necessary and possible interaction in a 2-maxitive Sugeno integral model.-
Coalition Formation.-
Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice.- Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited.-
Stable Matchings.-
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching.- Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information.-
Participatory Budgeting.-
Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules.- Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting.