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Game Theory and Economic Analysis

A Quiet Revolution in Economics

Medium: Buch
ISBN: 978-0-415-25987-3
Verlag: Routledge
Erscheinungstermin: 20.06.2002
Lieferfrist: bis zu 10 Tage

This book presents the huge variety of current contributions of game theory to economics. The impressive contributions fall broadly into two categories. Some lay out in a jargon free manner a particular branch of the theory, the evolution of one of its concepts, or a problem, that runs through its development. Others are original pieces of work that are significant to game theory as a whole.
After taking the reader through a concise history of game theory, the contributions include such themes as:

*the connections between Von Neumann's mathematical game theory and the domain assigned to him today
*the strategic use of information by game players
*the problem of the coordination of strategic choices between independent players
*cooperative games and their place within the literature of games plus new developments in non-cooperative games
*possible applications for game theory in industrial and financial economics differential qualitative games and entry dissuasion.


Produkteigenschaften


  • Artikelnummer: 9780415259873
  • Medium: Buch
  • ISBN: 978-0-415-25987-3
  • Verlag: Routledge
  • Erscheinungstermin: 20.06.2002
  • Sprache(n): Englisch
  • Auflage: Erscheinungsjahr 2002
  • Serie: Routledge Advances in Game Theory
  • Produktform: Gebunden
  • Gewicht: 476 g
  • Seiten: 204
  • Format (B x H x T): 161 x 240 x 16 mm
  • Ausgabetyp: Kein, Unbekannt
Autoren/Hrsg.

Herausgeber

Introduction PART I Historical insight 1 Von Neumann and Morgenstern in historical perspective 2 Rupture versus continuity in game theory: Nash versus Von Neumann and Morgenstern PART II Theoretical content 3 Bluff and reputation 4 An appraisal of cooperative game theory 5 The coalition concept in game theory 6 Do Von Neumann and Morgenstern have heterodox followers? 7 From specularity to temporality in game theory PART III Applications 8 Collective choice mechanisms and individual incentives 9 Team models as a framework to analyze coordination problems within the firm