Kit Fine on Truthmakers, Relevance, and Non-classical Logic

Chapter 1. Introduction (Federico L.G. Faroldi and Frederik Van De Putte).- Chapter 2. Short autobiography (Kit Fine).- Chapter 3. Modern faces of filtration (Johan van Benthem and Nick Bezhanishvili).- Chapter 4. Re?ections on filtration: A response to ‘modern faces of filtration’ by Johan van Benthem and Nick Bezhanishvili (Kit Fine).- Chapter 5. From felicitous models to answer set programming (Vladimir Lifschitz).- Chapter 6. Selective programming: Response to ‘From felicitous models to answer set programming’ by Vladimir Lifschitz (Kit Fine).- Chapter 7. Fine’s semantics for relevance logic and its relevance (Katalin Bimbó and Michael Dunn).- Chapter 8.Truthmaker semantics for relevance logic: Response to ‘Fine’s semantics for relevance logic and its relevance’ by Katalin Bimbó and J. Michael Dunn (Kit Fine).- Chapter 9. Conjunctive and disjunctive parts (Mark Jago).- Chapter 10. To be or not to be disjunctive: Response to Mark Jago’s ‘conjunctive and disjunctive parts’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 11. Truth-maker semantics for substructural logics (Ondrej Majer, Igor Sedlár and Vít Puncochár).- Chapter 12. Forms of conditionality: Response to ‘truth-maker semantics for some substructural logics’ by Ondrej Majer, , Igor Sedlár and Vít Puncochár.- Chapter 13. A strictly exact truthmaker semantics for non-transitive relevance and classical logic (Peter Verdée).- Chapter 14. The ghost of impossibility: Response to Peter Verdée’s ‘truthmakers and relevance for FDE, LP, K3 and CL’.- Chapter 15. Truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic (Peter Hawke and Aybuke Ozgun).- Chapter 16. An epistemized truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic: Response to Hawke’s and Ozgun’s ‘truthmaker semantics for epistemic logic’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 17. Counterfactuals, in?nity and paradox (Andrew Bacon).- Chapter 18. Defense of a truthmaker approach to counterfactuals: Response to Andrew Bacon’s ‘counterfactuals, in?nity and paradox’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 19. On the notion of aboutness in logical semantics (Alessandro Giordani).- Chapter 20. Situational and informational aboutness: Response to Giordani’s ‘on the notion of aboutness in logical semantics’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 21. Propositional potentialism (Peter Fritz).- Chapter 22. ‘The postulation of possibilities’: Response to Peter Fritz’s ‘propositional potentialism’ (Kit Fine).- Chater 23. The whole truth (Stephan Krämer).- Chapter 24. The whole truth: An internal perspective: Response to Krämer’s ‘the whole truth’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 25. New semantic framework for the logic of worldly grounding (and beyond) (Fabrice Correia).- Chapter 26. The algebraic and structural approaches to truthmaker semantics: Response to Fabrice Correia’s ‘a new semantic framework for the logic of worldly grounding (and beyond)’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 27. Permissive updates (Stephen Yablo and Daniel Rothschild).- Chapter 28. Truthmaker foundations for deontic logic: Response to Rothchild’s and Yablo’s ‘permissive updates’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 29. Comparing Russell and Fine on variable objects (Leon Horsten and Ryo Ito).- Chapter 30. Re?ning Russell: Response to Leon Horsten’s and Ryo Ito’s ‘Russell and Fine on variable objects’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 31. Fine on the possibility of vagueness (Andreas Ditter).- Chapter 32. In defense of a global view of vagueness: Response to Andreas Ditter’s ‘Fine on the possibility of vagueness’ (Kit Fine).- Chapter 33. Progressive logic (Kit Fine and Errol Martin).