Kostenloser Versand
Bequem zahlen
Wir sind gerne für Sie daThis book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists.
Produkteigenschaften
- Artikelnummer: 9780521593526
- Medium: Buch
- ISBN: 978-0-521-59352-6
- Verlag: Cambridge University Press
- Erscheinungstermin: 11.02.2011
- Sprache(n): Englisch
- Auflage: Erscheinungsjahr 2011
- Serie: Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory
- Produktform: Gebunden
- Gewicht: 562 g
- Seiten: 249
- Format (B x H x T): 157 x 235 x 19 mm
- Ausgabetyp: Kein, Unbekannt